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CSR Disclosure in Response to Major Airline Accidents:  
A Legitimacy-Based Exploration 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper contributes to the literature investigating disclosure reactions to 
legitimacy threats by analysing the corporate social responsibility disclosure reactions to 
catastrophic accidents suffered by major airlines. 
Design/methodology/approach – We use content analysis to examine changes in annual 
report disclosure in response to four separate airline disasters.  We adopt two 
classification schemes and two measurement approaches to explore these changes. 
Findings – We find that for three events the organisations appear to have responded with 
considerable increases in CSR disclosure that are consistent with attempts of legitimation.  
For one of the events examined we find no disclosure response and suggest that this 
could be due to the company’s unwillingness to accept responsibility.  
Research limitations/implications – The study’s focus on major airlines that have 
suffered an accident with available annual reports in English meant that other companies 
and more recent events had to be excluded from the analysis.  
Practical implications – The findings demonstrate the use of the annual report as a 
legitimation tool and further highlight the need for greater transparency and 
comparability across publications. 
Originality/value – The paper adds to the scarce literature examining corporate 
disclosure reactions following threats to their social legitimacy. 
 
Keywords: aviation accidents, content analysis, CSR disclosure, legitimacy theory. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of studies over the past quarter-century investigate corporations’ disclosure 
response to catastrophic events.  Almost universally couched in legitimacy theory 
arguments that the disasters increase the social and political exposures of the companies 
(or their industries), the examinations consistently document that firms respond to the 
legitimacy threats with increased social and/or environmental disclosure in their annual 
reports.  Almost all of the prior studies focus on events that are largely environmental in 
nature, and they tend to limit their analyses to changes in environmental disclosure.  In 
this study, we extend this body of research by examining whether a different type of 
catastrophic event – airline crashes with major loss of life – similarly induce disclosure 
reactions, and we look for this across a broader spectrum of social disclosures. 
We examine changes in annual report corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosures in response to four separate airline disasters occurring in the 21st century – 
Air France Flight 4590 (the Concorde crash) and Singapore Airlines Flight 006, both in 
2000, Scandinavian Airlines Flight 686 in 2001, and Air France Flight 447 in 2009.1  In 
each case, the accident resulted in significant casualties and, we argue, led to potential 
threats to the parent companies with respect to their social legitimacy.  Our analysis of 
the annual reports reveals that, for the first three events, the firms appear to have 
responded with changes in CSR disclosure that are consistent with attempts at 
legitimation.  We show that CSR disclosure in total (in terms of pages of information 
provided) increased substantially in each case, as did the amount of space allocated to 
                                                 
1 We note that 2014 saw several high profile airline disasters including the mysterious loss of Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 370 over the Indian Ocean, the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over the 
Ukraine, and the crash of AirAsia Flight 8501 in Indonesia.  The recency of these events precludes us from 
including them in our analysis.  
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disclosures classified as positive in nature and more specifically, disclosures related to 
companies’ health and safety practices.  We document that these changes are quite 
different from disclosure changes preceding the airline disasters.  Interestingly, we also 
show that the increases in CSR disclosure are far more extensive than the amount of 
space actually devoted to discussions of the accidents themselves. 
In contrast to the catastrophic events of the early 2000s, we fail to find similar 
responses with respect to Air France’s disclosures following the 2009 crash of Flight 447.  
The annual report space allocated to both total and positive-themed CSR disclosures 
declined relative to the prior year, and while health and safety disclosure space increased 
slightly, it was smaller than the corresponding increase in the prior period.  One potential 
explanation for this differing response is that Air France might instead have used its 
standalone sustainability report for a response in this latter period (Air France was not 
issuing standalone reports at the time of its 2000 accident).  However, a review of these 
reports finds similar patterns of CSR disclosure change as those in the annual reports. 
And while the global financial crisis may have played a role in the decreased emphasis on 
CSR information provision, we examined changes in disclosure across the two years for a 
sample of nine other European airlines and find that, on average, CSR disclosure actually 
increased slightly.  As such, we suggest the differing response may be a function of the 
longer-term investigation of the causes of this particular accident and Air France’s 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for the crash until the issuance of the formal 
investigative report almost three years later. 
In general, our study provides additional insight into corporate use of CSR disclosure 
as a legitimation tool.  The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides 
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background for our study and lays out our expectations.  This is followed by a discussion 
of our research methods.  The penultimate section of the paper presents the results of our 
analyses, and the paper concludes with a discussion of the findings. 
2. Background 
Drawing from the foundational work of Parsons (1960) and Weber (1978), legitimacy 
theory is centred on the notion of a social contract, whereby “business agrees to perform 
various socially desired actions in return for approval of its objectives, other rewards and 
ultimate survival” (Guthrie & Parker, 1989, p. 344).  Proponents of its use in disclosure 
research argue that a corporation can attempt to legitimate itself in the eyes of the public 
by voluntarily disclosing information about its social and environmental activities. A 
number of studies discuss specific legitimation strategies (e.g. Perrow, 1970; Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Savage et al., 2000), but Lindblom’s (1993) delineation of options perhaps 
best illuminates this potential role of disclosure.  Lindblom argues companies can 
respond to perceived legitimacy threats by:  
1. Bridging the output, methods, and goals into conformity with popular views of 
what is appropriate, thus making “internal adjustments to close the legitimacy 
gap” (Lindblom, 1993, p. 13). 
2. Making no internal adjustments but, rather, attempting to change perceptions, by 
demonstrating “the appropriateness of the output, methods, and goals to the public 
through education and information” (p. 14). 
3. Distract attention away from the issue of concern: “Identifying organizational 
output, methods, and goals with the popular perception of what is appropriate 
without any attempt at actual conformity” (p. 15). 
4. Seek an adjustment in societal expectations, by directing disclosure “toward 
bridging the relevant publics’ expectations in line with corporate output, methods, 
or goals” (p. 16).  
 
In each of the last three cases, firms rely on disclosure in an attempt to reduce their 
exposures to potential social and political costs.  Thus, Cho and Patten (2007), 
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specifically noting the voluntary nature of the activity, refer to the disclosure as a tool of 
legitimation in that it is used not to provide transparent accountability for social and 
environmental performance, but instead to enhance the image of the firm.   
Several studies within the CSR arena document disclosure changes in response to 
legitimacy threats arising from catastrophic events.  Both indirect and direct exposure 
settings have been investigated.  Patten (1992) and Walden and Schwartz (1997) 
examined the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on environmental disclosure in the 
annual reports of related, but not directly involved, American corporations and found that 
the levels of environmental disclosure increased significantly in the year following the 
accident.  Likewise, Coetzee & van Staden (2011) found that the entire South African 
mining industry evidenced an increase in disclosure levels following two major mining 
accidents.  On the other hand, Deegan & Rankin (1996), Deegan et al. (2000), Woodward 
et al. (2008), Cho (2009),  and de Villiers & van Staden (2011) all examined the reactions 
of companies directly exposed to legitimacy threats, and all document evidence of 
changing disclosure.  The findings of all these studies lend support to the argument that 
corporations seek to address a legitimacy threat by increasing disclosure, but almost all of 
them focus on events largely related to environmental exposures, and as such tend to 
examine primarily environmental information provision. 
In this study, we extend prior research by analysing the CSR disclosure reactions to 
catastrophic accidents suffered by major airlines.  Accidents can generally be defined as 
“discrete one-time undesirable or unfortunate events that happen unexpectedly in the life 
of a corporation and cause damage to any number or kind of stakeholders” 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2001, p. 420).  In a world characterised by “the instant and photographic 
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reporting of calamity” (p. 421) some accidents receive such extensive media coverage 
that they become landmarks in the history of a company, and such is the case with 
catastrophic aeroplane crashes over the years.  Bailey (2004), for example, notes that a 
number of major airlines, including Pan American, at one time the de facto flag-carrier of 
the United States, “have failed to recover from prolonged periods of crisis which were 
either precipitated, or worsened, by a badly-managed response to an aircraft accident.”  
According to Knight & Perry (1996), aviation disasters have resulted in a considerable 
negative impact on shareholder value as well as reduced credit ratings.  Indeed, 
Grossman (2005) further states that the negative impact of accidents is so significant that 
most airlines even retire the flight number after a crash, and Bailey (2004) asserts that 
some smaller aviation companies have been forced into bankruptcy or to change their 
brand name following major crashes.  We thus argue that aviation accidents likely lead to 
a major legitimacy threat for companies involved and offer an opportunity to extend the 
limited research into impacts of catastrophic events outside of the environmental domain 
(Coetzee & van Staden, 2011).  For our investigation, we limit the analysis to major 
crashes occurring in the 21st century, and we briefly describe each of these events in the 
methods section below. 
 Each of the disasters examined in this study resulted in substantial loss of life, 
received extensive media coverage, and, we argue, potentially introduced new social 
exposures for the airline companies involved.  Faced with a potential threat to their social 
legitimacy, the firms thus had an incentive to respond with increased CSR disclosure.  
Accordingly, the primary intent of our investigation is to identify how annual report CSR 
disclosures changed for each of the companies in the year following the relevant aviation 
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disaster.  Based on the prior studies of corporate CSR responses to other types of 
catastrophic events, we anticipate increased CSR disclosure in general.  However, given 
that prior studies indicate that firms seeking legitimacy tend to focus on providing 
information that portrays the companies in a positive light (see, e.g., Slack & Shrives, 
2008; Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Kotonen, 2009; Islam & Deegan, 2010; Mahadeo et al., 2011; 
Sen et al., 2011), we also anticipate that the increases will be more substantial in terms of 
positive, as opposed to negative disclosures.  Finally, the prior studies of changes in CSR 
disclosure in response to catastrophic events indicate changes in environmental exposures 
drive changes in environmental disclosure.  Since airline accidents relate more closely to 
health and safety issues, we also anticipate that, if the changes are driven by legitimacy 
concerns, airline firms will respond to the events with increases in disclosure in this specific 
area of CSR disclosure. 
3. Methods 
3.1 Events examined 
3.1.1. Air France Flight 4590 (the Concorde) crash 
The Concorde was the ‘flagship’ aircraft for both Air France and British Airways, an 
“emblem like no other of the power of technology” (Bunting, 2000). Following its 
departure from Paris’ Charles de Gaulle Airport on 25 July 2000, Air France Flight 4590, 
a non-scheduled service to New York City, crashed and burned 10 miles (15km) 
northeast of Paris.  After nearly a quarter of a century of providing the world’s only 
sustained supersonic passenger service, the Concorde suffered its first fatal accident 
(Gero, 2006).  All 109 persons aboard, including the nine members of its crew, plus four 
others on the ground, perished in the disaster, and an additional 6 persons suffered 
injuries.  The accident attracted an enormous amount of negative publicity, making it the 
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most famous air-crash in aviation industry (other than the September 11th attacks – Gero, 
2006).  As a consequence, both the French and the British civil aviation authorities 
revoked Concorde’s certificate of airworthiness. Although some modifications were 
made and Concorde re-entered regular service in November 2001, in the spring of 2003 
its only two operators announced that due to low passenger loads, high maintenance costs 
and the general slowdown in the airline industry, they would terminate its service by the 
end of the year, withdrawing from use the rest of the aircraft (Gero, 2006).  
3.1.2. SIA Flight 006 crash 
SIA had its first fatal accident and reportedly “experienced its darkest hour” (SIA, 
2001AR, p. 6) on 31st October 2000.  Designated as Flight 006, the wide-bodied Boeing 
747 SIA jetliner crashed during taking off at the T’ai-pei International Airport in Taiwan. 
The disaster resulted in the death of 83 of the 179 persons aboard the aircraft, including 
four cabin attendants.  Among the survivors, 57 passengers and 13 crew members 
suffered injuries and 25 other persons escaped unscathed – the latter including two of the 
three flight crewmen (Gero, 2006).  Not only did the accident spoil the company’s prior 
record of zero fatalities, it also generated a lot of negative publicity over SIA’s 
“catalogue of failings” (Perrin, 2000).  At the centre of the public criticism was the pilot’s 
inexplicable decision to use the wrong runway and to proceed with taking off despite 
severe weather conditions (Gero, 2006).  Survivors of the crash also stated that the 
members of staff were unable to help the passengers escape from the aircraft due to being 
frozen by fear and/or due to lack of competence in emergency procedures, with some 
flight attendants “failing to help passengers open emergency doors, fleeing the plane 
before all inside had been rescued” (Perrin, 2000).  These failings led hundreds of 
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survivors and relatives of those who perished to file lawsuits against the airline (SIA, 
2001AR) and the company subsequently dismissed the pilot and a co-pilot of that flight. 
The accident appeared to have an impact on SIA’s share price, which (after reaching a 
peak in October) in six months lost almost 30% of its market value despite the concurrent 
increase in turnover (SIA, 2001AR). 
3.1.3. SAS Flight SK686 crash 
SAS experienced its first fatal accident on 8 October 2001. SAS Flight SK686, an 
MD-87 plane carrying 110 people and heading to Copenhagen, Denmark, collided with a 
Cessna at Milan’s Linate airport.  The plane had just received clearance for take-off from 
the air traffic control tower when the Cessna taxied towards the runway.  The SAS MD-
87 collided with the Cessna and slid sideways into an airport building.  A total of 118 
people died, comprising all 110 people (104 passengers and 6 staff) on board the SAS 
flight.  Four people died in the Cessna, and four people who worked in the airport 
building also lost their lives (SAS, 2001AR).  To a world still reeling from September 
11th, the fiery collision of the two planes at Milan's airport looked at first like a terrorist 
attack, particularly since it occurred the day after the US invasion of Afghanistan.  This 
possibility was, however, ruled out by the investigations that followed (Gero, 2006). The 
airport’s director and air-traffic controller were among those found guilty for the disaster 
by an Italian court and were sentenced to spend from 6 to 8 years in prison.  The airline 
was exonerated of any responsibility.  However, considering that this was Italy's worst 
aviation disaster and the company’s first fatal accident, it attracted a lot of publicity and 
according to SAS’s 2001 annual report this was reflected in a 10% decrease in the 
company’s share price in the first week after the accident. 
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3.1.4. AF Flight 447 crash 
Almost nine years after the Concorde crash, Air France (which had, in the interim, 
merged with KLM) suffered a second plane aviation disaster.  Flight 447 was a scheduled 
commercial flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, and on 1 June 2009, the Airbus A330-203 
airliner used on the flight crashed into the Atlantic Ocean killing all 216 passengers and 
12 aircrew.  The accident was the deadliest in the history of the company and “one of the 
world’s worst aviation disasters” and led to “the biggest crash inquiry since Lockerbie” 
(Ross & Tweedie, 2012).  Authorities managed to locate the wreckage and retrieve the 
aircraft’s black boxes from the ocean floor only in May 2011.  The final report, released 
three years after the crash, stated that the reasons for the flight’s demise were temporary 
inconsistencies between the airspeed measurements coupled with incorrect reactions from 
the crew.  Prior to the issuance of this report, AF had refused to take any responsibility 
for the accident, instead calling for more thorough investigations in order to allow the 
company “to reconstruct precisely what happened on the flight and determine the causes 
of the accident” (AF, 2011CSR, p. 9). 
3.2 CSR disclosure measure 
 We examine event companies’ annual reports for CSR disclosures across a three-
year window including the reports for the two years preceding each accident (designated 
as Y-2 and Y-1) and the year of the disaster itself (Y1).  We developed our disclosure 
scale based on a review of prior investigations of annual report CSR disclosure (e.g., 
Ernst & Ernst, 1978; Gray et al., 1995: Deegan et al., 2000: 2002), Global Reporting 
Initiative reporting guidelines (GRI, 2002; 2006), and assessments of information being 
provided in our sample company reports.  The major themes consistently emerging from 
10 
 
these reviews included disclosures related to marketplace (consumers, creditors), 
workplace (employees), community, and environment, and we compiled a listing of 
relevant categories of information within each.2 However, given the specific focus of our 
investigation, we separately classify health and safety disclosure as its own category.3 
Consequently, information was considered to be CSR in nature if it related to any one of 
the content areas identified in Appendix A.   
Consistent with, for example, Patten (1992), Gray et al. (1995), Unerman (2000) and 
O’Dwyer (2003), we measure disclosure in pages to the hundredth of a page and include 
space related to both narrative and pictorial presentations (see Hackston and Milne, 
1996).4  For narrative disclosure, we measured pages in terms of the percentage of lines 
of print on the page,5 while pages of non-narrative disclosure (pictures, graphs, etc.) were 
calculated using a page-adjusted grid.6  For analysis related to sub-components of the 
disclosure, we follow Deegan et al. (2000; 2002) and classify disclosure as positive 
(negative) when it refers to information about CSR activities that have a positive or 
beneficial (negative or detrimental) impact on nature or society.  Finally, the health and 
safety disclosure items are identified in Appendix A.  For our sub-component analysis, 
                                                 
2 Following, for example, Gray et al. (1995), we also considered a separate category for ‘other’ disclosures.  
However, we found these to be virtually non-existent in our sample company documents and hence do not 
include this category in our presentation.   
3 Health and safety disclosures are often included as sub-components within the consumer, workplace, 
and/or environment classifications. 
4 Pesci and Costa (2014) have recently demonstrated the importance of considering pictorial disclosure in 
the form of images, graphs and tables in content analysis studies. For the purposes of our analysis, the 
general trends we report below for total disclosure held, in general, when only narrative disclosure space 
was considered. 
5 For example, if a page contained only narrative disclosure and 32 of 50 lines of print related to CSR 
themes, we assigned a page count of 0.64 pages. 
6 We also calculated CSR disclosure as the percentage of total space within each respective annual report.  
Disclosure patterns using this alternative measure were similar to those reported below for the page count 
metric and we do not include these in the presentation of results. 
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we identify the pages of CSR disclosure that are considered positive, negative, and health 
and safety-related, respectively. 7  
4. Results 
4.1 Total disclosure 
 Table 1 summarizes the extent of annual report disclosure for each of the four 
incidents examined in our study.  In addition to data on CSR disclosures, the table also 
identifies the amount of space allocated to discussions of the accidents.  If the airline 
companies perceive the accidents as increasing threats to the firms’ social legitimacy, we 
expect them to respond with increased CSR disclosure.  As noted in the table, the airline 
companies were fairly consistent with respect to the amount of coverage of the disasters, 
with space allocations ranging from 0.17 pages (AF Flight 447) to 0.46 pages (SAS 
Flight 686).  Interestingly, with the exception of the last accident (AF Flight 447), the 
companies exhibited substantially larger increases in the space devoted to CSR 
disclosures (relative to year Y-1) than the amount of accident coverage itself.  Air France 
increased CSR disclosure by 4.11 pages following the AF Flight 4590 accident, while the 
annual reports of Singapore Airlines and Scandinavian Airlines included increases in 
CSR disclosure of 5.92 and 13.79 pages, respectively.  A review of the CSR disclosure 
levels (and changes) for the years prior to the accidents highlights the unusual nature of 
the disclosure changes in response to the catastrophic events.  However, in contrast to the 
consistent patterns documented for the first three incidents, Air France’s annual report 
CSR disclosure following the Flight 447 crash actually decreased slightly.  Thus, with the 
                                                 
7 Reliability tests were conducted to ascertain consistency and replicability for the coding procedures. 
These included two stability tests (Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Cronbach’s Alpha) and five 
reproducibility tests (percent agreement; Scott’s Pi; Cohen’s Kappa; Fleiss’ Kappa; and Krippendorff’s 
Alpha). All tests were, on average,  above the .90 level and met reliability standards (Lombard et al., 2002). 
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exception of the final event, results support the argument that the airline companies 
appear to be using CSR disclosures to respond to potential legitimacy threats. 
---------- Table 1 about here --------- 
4.2 Positive versus Negative Disclosure 
 In Table 2 we summarize CSR disclosures based on the nature of the information 
being presented, where disclosures of positive-themed data is presumed to reflect 
attempts at legitimation.  Panel A of the table presents measures of positive-themed 
disclosures, whereas the extent of negative CSR information provision is identified in 
Panel B.  A review of Table 2 indicates a marked difference in changes across the two 
categories of information.  As highlighted in Panel A, again with the exception of 
disclosure following AF Flight 447, the affected companies showed substantial increases 
in the provision of positive-themed CSR information.  The increases ranged from 5.34 
pages to 6.85 pages, and in each case the change is dramatically higher than the 
difference in disclosure from year Y-2 to year Y-1.  In contrast, while each of the firms’ 
annual reports also showed increases in the space allocated to negative-themed CSR 
disclosure (see Panel B of Table 2), the increases are far less dramatic than for the 
changes in positive disclosure.  Once again, however, the disclosure response to AF 
Flight 447 stands in contrast to the other events.  Air France’s positive CSR disclosures 
went down by over five pages following the accident while negative disclosure space 
increased by almost a page.  Consistent with the results with respect to total CSR 
disclosure, the findings regarding changes in positive-themed information provision, 
excepting the AF Flight 447 response, appear to support a legitimation argument. 
---------- Table 2 about here ---------- 
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4.3 Health and Safety Disclosures 
 Our third element of analysis centres on changes in space allocated to health and 
safety CSR disclosures following the airline accidents.  Given the nature of the events we 
examine, we would anticipate a stronger focus on health and safety information provision 
following the disasters if the disclosure is aimed at addressing legitimacy concerns.  As 
shown in Panel A of Table 3, the level of health and safety information provision is 
higher in the post-accident year in all four cases than it had been for either of the years 
preceding the crashes.  However, while the increases in health and safety disclosures are 
relatively high (given the levels of disclosure in the pre-event periods) for the first three 
disasters, Air France’s increase following the Flight 447 event is more modest at only 
0.26 pages.  As noted in the table, this increase is actually considerably smaller than the 
increase of 0.83 pages from Y-2 to Y-1.  In order to better assess the relative change in 
health and safety information provision in comparison to other CSR data, we show, in 
Panel B of Table 3, the percentage change in space following each accident relative to the 
average disclosure levels for the two years prior to the event.  As documented in Panel B, 
the percentage increases in space are substantially more pronounced for health and safety 
information than for other CSR disclosures, and this holds in all four cases, although, 
once again, the change is much smaller following Air France’s second incident than for 
any of the other disasters.    
---------- Table 3 about here --------- 
 Similar to our analysis of overall CSR disclosures, we next assess the changes in 
health and safety information across positive and negative classifications.  As indicated in 
Table 4, in all four cases, while the affected companies increased the amount of space 
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allocated to both positive and negative health and safety information, the increases were 
more pronounced with respect to the former.  Indeed, with the exception of the AF 447 
disaster, the increase in positive health and safety disclosures were more than double the 
amount of increase in negative information.  In general, the analysis of health and safety 
disclosures supports the claim that the airline companies were using CSR disclosures as a 
response to the potential legitimacy threat arising from the disastrous crashes. 
---------- Table 4 about here --------- 
4.4 Additional analysis – AF Flight 447 
 While the CSR disclosure responses to the first three events are consistently in line 
with legitimation arguments, the lack of a similar pattern following Air France’s Flight 
447 disaster is not.  One possible explanation for the lack of response noted for the last 
event is that Air France may have used an alternative medium, its standalone CSR report, 
to respond to the 2009 event.  The company was not issuing a standalone report at the 
time of the Concorde crash, but began doing so in 2003.  As such, we extend the analysis 
for this event by accessing and reviewing the standalone CSR reports for the years 
surrounding the AF Flight 447 accident.  Similar to the annual report analyses, we focus 
on changes in total space, changes in positive disclosures, and changes in the provision of 
health and safety-related information.  Table 5 presents the results of the standalone 
report examination, and, as highlighted in the table, we find decreases in disclosure for 
each of the metrics.  And while the decreases are less pronounced than similar reductions 
in disclosure from Y-2 to Y-1, this pattern does not support a legitimation argument.  
 ---------- Table 5 about here --------- 
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The global financial crisis of the late 2000s might also potentially explain Air 
France’s decreases in CSR disclosure for 2009.  At times of financial concerns, 
companies could choose to focus more specifically on economic issues.  If this is the 
case, we would likewise expect other similar companies to reflect decreased CSR 
disclosure in their annual reports for 2009.  We explore this potential explanation by 
examining the financial report CSR disclosures in 2008 and 2009 annual reports for nine 
other European airlines.8  While three of the companies did reduce the extent of CSR 
disclosures, only one, Flybe, was on a scale similar to the reduction noted for Air France.  
Further, the remaining six airlines exhibited increases in CSR disclosure, and on average 
across the nine companies, the extent of information changes was a positive 0.16 pages.  
These results would appear to suggest that Air France’s response was not merely a 
reaction to the global financial crisis.  We discuss the contrary findings for AF Flight 447 
in more detail in the conclusion section which follows. 
5. Conclusion 
 In this study, we extend prior research into the use of CSR disclosure as a tool of 
legitimation by examining the changes in CSR information provided in the annual reports 
of airline companies suffering major catastrophic crashes in the 21st century.  Consistent 
with prior studies focusing primarily on environmental incidents and environmental 
disclosure (e.g., Cho, 2009; de Villiers and van Staden, 2011; Patten, 1992), we find, for 
three of the four disasters examined, evidence that the affected company appeared to 
change its CSR disclosure, presumably in an attempt to address legitimacy disclosures.  
Air France (in response to the Concorde crash in 2000), Singapore Airlines, and 
                                                 
8 These are Aer Lingus, Aeroflot, British Airways, Easyjet, Flybe, Iberia Airlines, Lufthansa, Ryanair, and 
Scandinavian Airlines. 
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Scandinavian Airlines all showed substantial increases in the space devoted to CSR 
information in annual reports released following the crashes.  More specific analysis 
further indicates each of the firms exhibited substantially more disclosure of a positive 
nature following the disasters, and also allocated more space to disclosures related to 
health and safety issues.  We interpret these changes as evidence of attempts at 
legitimation. 
 In contrast to the cases noted above, we find a different pattern of change in annual 
report CSR disclosure following the crash of Air France Flight 447 in 2009.  Both total 
disclosure and the provision of items of a positive nature decreased in the report 
subsequent to the incident, and while the amount of space devoted to health and safety 
issues showed a small increase, it was not as large as a similar increase the prior year.  
We find similar patterns regarding changes in disclosure in Air France’s standalone CSR 
reports for the years associated with the Flight 447 accident, and we document that, 
although 2009 was the height of the worldwide financial crisis of the late 2000s, other 
European airlines did not show a similar decrease in CSR disclosure.  While the decrease 
in overall CSR disclosure for Air France could potentially be a function of the Flight 447 
crash being the second disaster for the company in a relatively short period of time 
(leading to a potential concern that stakeholders would find CSR disclosure changes more 
disingenuous for a subsequent event), it would stand in contrast to Cho’s (2009) findings 
of substantial increases in disclosure by the French oil company Total following a second 
major environmental disaster in the early 2000s.  Instead, we believe Air France’s 
anomalous response may instead be a function of the company’s refusal to take 
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responsibility for the accident until the issuance of the formal investigative report in 
2012.   
 In general, our evidence suggests that catastrophic events outside of the 
environmental domain also appear to induce at least some affected companies to use CSR 
disclosure to address potential legitimacy threats.  As such, the findings add credence to 
concerns raised regarding the use of the disclosure.  CSR reporting is often argued as a 
potentially powerful tool for increasing the transparency and accountability of 
organizations with respect to their social and environmental impacts (see, e.g. Gray and 
Bebbington, 2000; Medawar, 1976; Unerman et al., 2007).  But Gray and Bebbington 
(2000, p. 16) further note that where CSR disclosure is voluntary, it will only reflect 
those aspects of performance that companies are willing to release, and accordingly, it 
can “only be a legitimation device and not an accountability mechanism.”   
It is important to note that our investigation, like all studies, is subject to 
limitations.  We acknowledge that we examine only four incidents, and as such, the 
findings are anecdotal in nature.  Accordingly, the extent to which the actions we 
document would hold in other time frames or across other types of legitimacy-threatening 
situations cannot be assessed.  Extending assessments of the corporate use of CSR 
disclosure to legitimacy-threatening events in other social arenas and across wider areas 
of time could provide additional insights on the practice.  Further, particularly given the 
differential findings for the AF Flight 447 incident, qualitative investigations of the 
corporate response to airline disasters, and other social events with potential legitimacy 
impacts, could shed light on managerial perceptions of the response. 
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Table 1 – Pages of annual report disclosure. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   
            Total CSR 
             Disclosure 
     Accident          Change    Change 
Event   Disclosure    Y-2      Y-1      Y1      Prior     Post 
 
AF Flight 4590         0.25   8.44    10.55   14.66       2.11      4.11 
 
SIA Flight 006         0.43   4.91      6.21   12.13        1.30      5.92 
 
SAS Flight 686        0.46  12.31    11.65   25.44       -0.66    13.79 
 
AF Flight 447     0.17  23.04    23.82   23.62        0.78     -0.20 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 – Pages of annual report disclosure – CSR sub-components. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   
Panel A - Positive CSR Disclosures 
                 Change    Change 
Event     Y-2     Y-1    Y1          Prior      Post 
 
AF Flight 4590    5.75    7.14  13.21     1.39      6.07 
 
SIA Flight 006      4.55    5.40  10.84       0.85      5.34 
 
SAS Flight 686    7.99    8.34  15.19       0.35        6.85 
 
AF Flight 447  14.21  16.11    8.99           1.90     -5.22 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B - Negative CSR Disclosures 
                 Change    Change 
Event     Y-2     Y-1    Y1        Prior     Post 
 
AF Flight 4590    0.63    0.70   0.87          0.07     0.17 
 
SIA Flight 006    0.28    0.37   0.79          0.09     0.42 
 
SAS Flight 686    1.52    1.11   3.37       -0.41     2.26 
 
AF Flight 447    3.07    4.18   5.05          1.11     0.93 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 – Health and Safety CSR Disclosures 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A – Health and Safety CSR Disclosures over Time 
                 Change    Change 
Event     Y-2     Y-1    Y1          Prior     Post 
 
AF Flight 4590    1.19    0.32   1.60         -0.87     1.28 
 
SIA Flight 006    0.32    0.64   2.12          0.32     1.48 
 
SAS Flight 686    1.80    3.02   5.92          1.22     2.90 
 
AF Flight 447    1.42    2.25   2.51           0.83     0.26 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B – Percentage Change in Disclosure versus Other CSR Areasa 
 
    Health and Safety  All Other CSR 
Event      Disclosures     Disclosures 
 
AF Flight 4590         +112.0%         + 49.7% 
 
SIA Flight 006         +341.7%         + 74.1% 
 
SAS Flight 686           +145.6%         + 99.9% 
 
AF Flight 447         +  36.8%         +   6.2% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  Percentage change in disclosure is computed as (disclosure in Y1 minus average pages 
of disclosure for Y-2 and Y-1)/average pages of disclosure for Y-2 and Y-1.  
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Table 4 – Health and Safety CSR Disclosures – CSR sub-components. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   
Panel A - Positive Health and Safety Disclosures 
                 Change    Change 
Event     Y-2     Y-1    Y1          Prior      Post 
 
AF Flight 4590    1.07    0.25  1.31    -0.82         1.06 
 
SIA Flight 006      0.28    0.54  1.58       0.26      1.04 
 
SAS Flight 686    1.00    2.50  4.28       1.50        1.78 
 
AF Flight 447    1.42    2.13  2.24           0.71      0.21 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B - Negative Health and Safety Disclosures 
                 Change    Change 
Event     Y-2     Y-1    Y1        Prior     Post 
 
AF Flight 4590    0.07    0   0.29        -0.07     0.29 
 
SIA Flight 006    0.04    0.06   0.54          0.02     0.48 
 
SAS Flight 686    0.33    0.20   1.13       -0.13     0.93 
 
AF Flight 447      0      0   0.17            0      0.17 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5 – Pages of Air France standalone CSR report disclosure – AF Flight 447 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   
                 Change    Change 
Disclosure Area    Y-2     Y-1    Y1           Prior     Post 
 
Total     43.97  38.28 35.75    -4.69    -2.53 
 
Positive    40.45  34.75 29.98      -5.70    -4.77 
 
Health & Safety     3.31    2.64   2.47    -0.66    -0.17 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix A – CSR disclosure categories 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A. Health and Safety 
1. Health and safety at the workplace 
• Any reference/compliance to health and safety law 
• Information to employees, training on health and safety 
• Accidents, with reference to the employees 
• Receiving safety awards 
• Conducting research to improve work safety 
• Standard injury, lost day and absentee rates and number of work-related fatalities 
• Description of policies or programmes on specific diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS) 
• Providing information on industrial action related to health and safety 
• Incidents of air rage  
• Reference to aircraft age when not linked with noise, emissions, or energy   
2. Health and safety at the marketplace  
• Health and safety of the product 
• Accidents, with reference to the customers 
• Description of policy for preserving customer health and safety during use of 
products and services 
• Monitoring systems and results of monitoring of these policies 
3. Health and safety of community  
• Description of policies to manage health and safety impacts on communities 
affected by organisational activities 
• Extent to which these policies are visibly stated and applied 
• Monitoring systems and results of monitoring these policies  
• Disclosures regarding noise: infringements, fines, plane night movements 
• Reference to aircraft age when linked with noise 
• Reference to Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) and departures on track 
4. Health and safety – other  
• Other general issues regarding health and safety 
B. Marketplace 
5. Consumers 
• Consumer complaints and related awards  
• Congestion, when linked with customer delays but not additional fuel   
• Specific customer relations (over and beyond ‘our duty to the customer’) 
• Provision for disabled, aged, etc. customers 
• Provision for difficult to reach customers 
• Training employees in customer service  
• Consumer privacy policy, procedures/management systems and compliance 
mechanisms 
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• Expansions in the route network (but NOT information on their first class offers 
or dietary offers/ other ‘new services’) 
• Consultation with consumers (frequency, information generated, use of 
information) 
6. Creditors 
• Specific creditor relations  
• Policies with regards to creditors 
• Consultation with creditors (frequency, information generated, use of 
information) 
C. Workplace  
7. Employee and pension data 
• Statutory average numbers employed by category and wages (including pension 
and social security costs) and geographic area 
• Statutory numerical analysis of employees> £30,000 
• Statutory disclosures of directors’ emoluments (but not their bios) 
• Thanks to employees  
• Donations ditto by/ through employees  
• Statutory particulars for commitments for pensions, whether or not provided 
• Pensions and benefits beyond coverage of statutory material  
• Any other employee information, not covered in the below categories, including 
reference to social audits  
8. Equal opportunities and employee development – training  
• Training above health and safety 
• Training employees in customer service  
• Training employees in environmental issues  
• Average hours of training per year per employee by category of employee 
• General employee development  
• Description of equal opportunity policies or programmes (racial, sexual equality, 
parental leave, etc.) and policies on harassment and bullying 
• Statutory reference to the employment of disabled persons (including retraining) 
• Monitoring systems to ensure compliance – results of monitoring 
• Indicators of diversity as culturally appropriate (e.g. female/male ration in senior 
management and corporate governance bodies) 
• Policies/references to bribery and corruption in the marketplace 
9. Human rights  
• Policies, guidelines, corporate structure and procedures to deal with all aspects of 
human rights relevant to operations, including immigration/ asylum seekers’ cases 
• Consideration of human rights within the supply chain and on selection of 
suppliers/ contractors, excluding collective bargaining/ references to industrial 
relations  
• Description of policy excluding child labour as defined by the ILO Convention 
138 
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• Description of policy to prevent forced and compulsory labour and extent to 
which this policy is visibly stated and applied 
• Any reference to policies regarding prevention of sexual or other harassment 
• Monitoring systems of the above policies and results of monitoring  
10. Consultation with employees 
• Statutory action with respect to informing employees on matters of concern, 
consulting employees or representatives, encouraging (and engaging in) employee 
participation 
• Statutory increasing employee financial and economic awareness  
• Reference to industrial relations, strike action or talks with unions 
• Employee opinion surveys and individual advice and counselling 
11. Share ownership  
• Statutory encouragement and participation of employees in share schemes, profit 
sharing, ESOPs, where employees does not mean directors 
• Schemes/ reference must be to employees (exclude if reference is to executive or 
directors only)  
• Loans for this purpose but not directors 
• SAYE options  
D. Community 
12. Community involvement  
• Any reference to community and/ or social involvement outside the labour force 
• Sponsoring/ funding schools, arts, sports, medical research, development of local 
communities/ industries and activities  
• Particular reference to bribery and corruption in communities 
• Consultation with community (frequency, information generated, use of 
information) 
• Excluding charities  
13. Charities  
• Statutory donations in monetary form or in kind to registered charities within the 
Company Act 
• Donations ditto by/ through employees (e.g. GAYE schemes)  
• Statutory references and amounts of political donations (as they fall within the 
same Company Act requirement)  
E. Environment 
14. Environmental pollution  
• Air, Water (including consumption), emissions, visual quality, fuel jettison and 
pollution plus any attempt to identify, improve or prevent pollution 
• Environmental audits and charges pertaining to emissions, pollution  
• Conservation of natural resources, waste and recycling including improvements in 
products 
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• Statements indicating that the company’s operations are in compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations; recognition of the need to comply with 
society standards and regulations  
• Involvements with schemes (E.g. Business in the Environment, Business in 
Community, ACBE, etc.) 
• Except in so far as its part of the business (e.g. waste disposal or environmental 
technology) 
• Environmental Awards won or external praise for environmental work 
• Reference to aircraft age when linked to emissions 
15. Energy 
• Energy saving and conservation  
• Fuel (i.e. oil, gas) and electricity consumption, fuel jettison and charges pertaining 
to energy 
• Use/ development/ exploration of new sources, efficiency, insulation, etc. 
• Except in so far as it is part of the business (e.g. oil exploration companies) 
• Utilising waste materials for energy production 
• Disclosing energy savings resulting from product recycling 
• Discussing the company’s efforts to reduce energy consumption  
• Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products 
• Receiving awards for energy conservation programmes 
• Disclosing the company’s energy policies  
• Reference to aircraft age when linked to energy savings 
• Reference to congestion when linked to additional fuel 
16. Aesthetics 
• Designing facilities harmonious with the environment 
• Contributions in the terms of case or art/sculptures to beautify the environment 
• Restoring historical buildings/structures  
• General environmental activities linked with tourism 
17. Environment – other  
• Undertaking environmental impact studies to monitor the company’s impact on 
the environment, conducting reviews of performance, employing specialist 
consultants  
• Wildlife conservation, environmental newsletters and biodiversity 
• Training employees in environmental issues   
F. Other 
18. Value added statement 
• Any reference to the creation and distribution of value added 
• Any statement headed valued added or added value 
• Any statement with ‘distribution’ to employees and state (not including 
shareholders)  
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19. Other CSR information  
• General CSR objectives and mission statements; ethics; political statements; value 
of company to nation, economy; assurance statements; general references to 
stakeholders and competitors and to sustainability 
 
